The dark logic of visual strongman propaganda

Thu, 30 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000

This article was originally published at The Loop and is republished here under a Creative Commons BY-ND 4.0 license. Co-authored with Jonas Bergan Dræge, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Karsten Donnay.

US President Donald Trump’s recent crackdown on migration has not only been enforced on the ground but also in his official communication. The White House’s visual communication is resolute yet comical, portraying President Trump as a guarantor of law and order.

This visual framing of his presidency is not coincidental. Earlier examples from Trump’s first term feature similar imagery and videos, especially during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests. These images are reminiscent of power-projecting propaganda usually associated with autocrats such as Venezuelan ex-president Nicolas Maduro or Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

What is the purpose of this heavy-handed visual strongman propaganda? How does the public perceive and react to it? And is it effective in making the government look stronger in the eyes of citizens? In three pre-registered survey experiments recently published in the European Journal of Political Research, Perspectives on Politics, and the Journal of Peace Research, we systematically explored these questions across Türkiye, the United States, and Venezuela.

Is visual strongman propaganda effective?

Previous studies on information control in autocracies gives us an important baseline expectation derived from the closed autocratic system in China. The main purpose of the kind of ‘hard propaganda’ often used in China is quite unlike other forms of propaganda. Its main goal is not necessarily to persuade, but to dominate. It is intended to signal resolve and thereby deter opposition to the government. But does such propaganda also work in autocracies that face more contestation (Venezuela), hold competitive but unfair elections (Türkiye) or even in democracies (the United States)?

Regime type, extent of contestation, and societal polarisation determine the effectiveness of visual strongman propaganda. These factors shape how such propaganda is perceived, and whether it works to deter anti-government movements

Across our three studies, we argue that regime type, extent of contestation, and societal polarisation matter. They shape how such propaganda is perceived and whether it works to deter anti-government movements. The graph below shows citizens' stated willingness to join anti-government protests, normalised across our three studies. We expect that the deterrence effects of hard propaganda are most noticeable for citizens initially opposed to the government. In addition, for our Turkish experiment, we study two distinct points in time, contrasting a politically stable versus a contested electoral period.

Does hard visual propaganda deter anti-government protest?

Despite variation in experimental designs and country contexts, the general picture from our results is clear. Coercive forms of visual government propaganda highlighting repressive capacities have a noticeable effect on citizens opposing the government in all three countries.

The effect of hard propaganda on anti-government protest willingness for government opponents

Venezuela and US: coercive versus baseline image. Türkiye: power-projecting propaganda video versus nature control videos. Türkiye 2022 = stable times; Türkiye 2023 = during electoral campaign. 95% confidence intervals. Source: European Journal of Political Research, Perspectives on Politics and Journal of Peace Research.

In line with the baseline expectation from China, hard propaganda deterred anti-government protests in Venezuela in 2020 and in Türkiye in 2022. Exposure decreases the likelihood of reporting joining an anti-government protest between six and seven percentage points during politically stable times. In sharp contrast, during the heated electoral presidential campaign in Türkiye in 2023, this deterrence effect attenuates to zero. In other words, when anti-government citizens are already mobilised, hard propaganda fails to deter.

When anti-government citizens are already mobilised, hard propaganda fails to deter

The result from the United States is strikingly different. During the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, hard visual propaganda backfired, increasing protest willingness among opponents. This suggests clearly that democratic leaders borrowing from the authoritarian playbook must expect resistance, particularly in polarised societies.

What explains these results?

In the Turkish study, we dug deeper into the potential mechanisms behind these patterns, focusing on how power-projecting propaganda provokes different emotions and feelings among opponents and supporters. The graph below illustrates that this type of propaganda evokes anxiety and anger among government opponents. Surprisingly, though, it also increases the feeling of societal belonging, suggesting that these often very nationalistic propaganda videos may indeed persuade some opponents.

But our study also shows that this persuasion effect is much stronger for government supporters. Among core supporters, it increases the willingness to join pro-government protests. This is especially true during contested periods, when autocrats benefit the most from pro-government mobilisation.

The effect of power-projecting propaganda on emotional outcomes and feelings

Türkiye only, government opponents. Power-projecting propaganda videos versus nature control videos. 95% confidence intervals. Source: European Journal of Political Research.

What this means for democracy

Our research helps understand information control, autocratic politics, and democratic backsliding. First, we document that, most of the time, hard visual propaganda also works in more competitive and contested electoral autocratic regimes. Second, and comparable to recent findings from China, we find that its effectiveness in deterring opposition supporters may weaken during times of opposition mobilisation and crisis. Third, hard propaganda serves a dual purpose in polarised electoral regimes. It mobilises supporters exactly when authoritarian leaders face increased contention.

In general, hard visual propaganda works not only in closed but also in more competitive electoral autocratic regimes

Recalling Trump’s use of hard propaganda, our results are at the same time encouraging and worrisome for US democracy. Democratic institutions protect fundamental rights, including the right to protest. In this setting, visual hard propaganda can mobilise government opponents. Yet we did not find any evidence that Trump supporters were dismissive of such forms of propaganda in 2020.

That said, President Trump’s recent hard propaganda and coercive law and order messaging around the surge in ICE deportations suggests that there may be limits to this strategy. Even among a growing number of Republican voters, his policies and rhetoric seem to have simply gone too far.

This article was originally published at The Loop and is republished here under a Creative Commons BY-ND 4.0 license.

Blog | Philipp M. Lutscher